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THE NCAA’S TRANSFER CONUNDRUM
Christopher J. Gerace*
INTRODUCTION
In September 2018, Kelly Bryant was demoted from the position of starting quarterback for the Clemson University football team.1 While it is not
uncommon for players to be benched in college athletics, whether it is a
result of performance, behavior, or otherwise, Bryant reacted negatively to
the benching, calling it a “slap in the face.”2 Only a few days after being
benched, and after a conversation with Clemson head coach Dabo Swinney,
Bryant announced that he would be transferring to a new school.3
Transfers in National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I
sports have become a topic of interest and controversy in recent years.
Trends from the NCAA’s own research appear to indicate that there has
been a small uptick in the incidence of student-athlete transfers in the
NCAA’s revenue-generating sports,4 though the increase in some sports has
been smaller than others. More specifically, men’s ice hockey has seen a
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2020; Bachelor of Science in
Biology, The Ohio State University, 2016. I would like to thank Professor Patricia Bellia for
her consistent support and guidance and the members of the Notre Dame Law Review for
their thorough and tireless editing and encouragement. Finally, I want to thank my
parents, brothers, family, and friends for their patience and love, and for helping to shape
me into the fun-loving person that I am today. All errors are my own.
1 Adam Rittenberg, Benched QB Kelly Bryant Misses Clemson’s Tuesday Practice, ESPN
(Sept. 25, 2018), http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/24797781/kelly-bryant-relegated-clemson-bench-misses-tuesday-practice.
2 Andrea Adelson, Kelly Bryant to Transfer from Clemson, Calls Demotion ‘Slap in the Face,’
ESPN (Sept. 26, 2018), http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/24801672/
demoted-clemson-tigers-qb-kelly-bryant-says-transfer.
3 Id. Bryant ultimately transferred to the University of Missouri, where he is expected
to play in the 2019–20 football season as a graduate transfer. Barrett Sallee, Former Clemson
QB Kelly Bryant Chooses Missouri as His Transfer Destination, CBS SPORTS (Dec. 5, 2018),
https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/former-clemson-qb-kelly-bryantchooses-missouri-as-his-transfer-destination/.
4 For the purposes of this Note, “revenue-generating sports” in the NCAA refer to
men’s ice hockey, men’s and women’s basketball, baseball, and football. These are not the
only sports that generate any revenue at all; rather, they are the sports specifically excluded
from the NCAA’s “One-Time Transfer Exception,” which is discussed infra subsection
I.B.3. 2018–19 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 14.5.5.2.10, at 187 (2018) [hereinafter DIVISION
I MANUAL], https://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4547-2018-2019-ncaa-division-i-manualaugust-version-available-august-2018.aspx.
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dramatic increase in the proportion of its student-athletes who have transferred in the last fourteen or so years, while men’s and women’s basketball
and bowl subdivision football have all seen modest increases in the number
of student-athlete transfers over that same time frame.5 AthleticDirectorU
has done an in-depth analysis of the recent trend of transfers in NCAA men’s
basketball, stating that “transfers have become a vitally important aspect of
college basketball.”6 The NCAA’s graduate-transfer rule—which generally
permits student-athletes, who are enrolled in graduate school at a different
institution from where they received their undergraduate degree, to participate immediately in their respective sport7—has contributed significantly to
the overall prevalence and impact of student-athlete transfers on collegiate
athletics. The number of graduate transfers in the NCAA has increased
markedly since 2011.8 Many of the most noteworthy cases of student-athletes
exercising their graduate-transfer eligibility have come in just the last few
years, mostly in college football.9 Graduate-transfer quarterbacks in particular have drawn a large amount of attention, if for no reason other than their
importance on the football field. In what has become a new trend in college
football, reliance on quarterbacks joining Division I teams via the graduatetransfer rule is beginning to look like the new normal.10 Because of the
5 See NCAA RESEARCH, TRANSFER COMPETITION OF DIVISION I TEAMS (2018), http://
www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2018RES_APR_transfer_slides_june2018_final_201807
16.pdf (noting, among other things, that “[t]he uptick in four-year college transfer among
women is occurring across a number of sports, but is particularly visible in women’s basketball”); Transfer Rate Averages and Trends: Trends by Sport, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/
about/resources/research/transfer-rate-averages-and-trends (last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
6 Eli Boettger, Investigating College Basketball’s Transfer Movement, ATHLETICDIRECTORU,
https://athleticdirectoru.com/articles/investigating-college-basketballs-transfer-move
ment/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
7 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, § 14.6.1, at 190.
8 See Prevalence of Graduate Transfer in Division I, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/
resources/research/prevalence-graduate-transfer-division-i (last updated Sept. 2018)
(“Graduate transfers are most prevalent on a percentage basis in men’s basketball (2.1
percent of current players are grad transfers), women’s basketball, football, and men’s and
women’s track and field.”).
9 It is also worth noting that the NCAA’s own research indicates that “the number of
[cases of graduate transfers in men’s football] has increased almost tenfold since 2011 (17
in 2011, 168 in 2017).” Id.
10 See Brooks Kubena, Joe Burrow Marks First for LSU Amid Spiking Trend—A Deep Dive
into Grad Transfers, ADVOCATE (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.theadvocate.com/
baton_rouge/sports/lsu/article_1a1cb42e-abba-11e8-8eef-530e6fdd701b.html (noting that
there were “24 graduate transfer quarterbacks making their debuts on new Division I rosters” at the beginning of the 2018 college football season); Tom Layberger, LSU’s Joe Burrow Among Grad Transfer Quarterbacks That Appeared with New Teams, FORBES (Sept. 4, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomlayberger/2018/09/04/lsus-joe-burrow-among-gradtransfer-quarterbacks-that-appeared-with-new-teams/#1a67b99e3221. In another high-profile example of a quarterback using the graduate-transfer exception to gain immediate
eligibility at a new school, Jalen Hurts transferred from the University of Alabama to the
University of Oklahoma in January 2019 after playing three seasons at Alabama. Cliff
Brunt, Former Alabama QB Jalen Hurts Transferring to Oklahoma, NCAA (Jan. 16, 2019),

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-4\NDL412.txt

2019]

unknown

Seq: 3

the ncaa’s transfer conundrum

29-MAY-19

15:37

1821

immense amount of media attention that college football generally garners,
it may seem as though transfers (graduate or otherwise) are most prevalent
in that sport only, but the impact of the transfer rules has been felt throughout collegiate athletics.
College coaches and administrators have not been shy about discussing
the impact of the increasing number of transfers in their respective sports.
One men’s basketball coach anonymously said that “[t]ransfers and grad
transfers have changed recruiting more for us than any calendar change.”11
The popularity of graduate transfers, and the fact that the student-athletes
have immediate eligibility upon transferring to play without sitting out a year,
seems to have galvanized the movement for more flexibility and freedom for
undergraduate student-athletes who want to have control over where they
play a college sport, without having to wait a year sitting out under the
NCAA’s longstanding year-in-residence rule.12 Coaches have become concerned with the creation of something akin to free agency in professional
sports, fearing that allowing student-athletes to transfer at will and without
restriction will damage the landscape of college athletics. And the graduatetransfer rule seems to be particularly hard on mid-major schools that risk
losing their best players if they develop into great players and are able to
graduate early or retain a year of eligibility after receiving their undergraduate degrees. While the rule was undoubtedly intended to create a reward of
sorts for student-athletes who earned their diplomas, school officials seem to
believe that it has had a fairly negative impact on the sports themselves.13
This has led to some coaches pondering measures that seem inconsistent
with the goals of the graduate-transfer rule and with academic considerations
generally: at least one mid-major Division I men’s basketball head coach has
stated an intention to “slow[ ] down the graduating process” for student-ath-

https://www.ncaa.com/news/football/article/2019-01-16/jalen-hurts-alabama-oklahomatransfer. Hurts was the starting quarterback for Alabama for his first two seasons, leading
the team to two national championship games. Id.
11 Matt Norlander, Candid Coaches: Will the NCAA’s New Rules and Calendar Make Recruiting Better or Worse in College Hoops?, CBS SPORTS (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.cbssports
.com/college-basketball/news/candid-coaches-will-the-ncaas-new-rules-and-calendar-makerecruiting-better-or-worse-in-college-hoops/.
12 Many of the NCAA transfer bylaws include a requirement of enrollment for one full
academic year before a transferring student-athlete will be eligible to play his sport at a new
school. See DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, § 14.02.14–.14.1, at 161. This year-in-residence requirement has existed since the 1950s. Dennis Dodd, Why the NCAA Faces an
Uphill Battle as It Again Tries to Reform Its Transfer Rule, CBS SPORTS (Apr. 2, 2018), https://
www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/why-the-ncaa-faces-an-uphill-battle-as-it-againtries-to-reform-its-transfer-rule/.
13 See Jeff Goodman, The Graduate-Transfer Rule Is Causing All Kinds of Problems, ESPN
(Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/17487374/thegraduate-transfer-rule-hurting-college-basketball (discussing opinions of numerous college
coaches and concluding that while the academic goals of the graduate-transfer rule were
“pure,” there have been unexpected side effects of the rule being enacted by the NCAA).
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letes so as to lessen the chances that the players are able to jump ship, so to
speak, to a larger or more prominent program.14
In a sense, some feel as though the graduate-transfer rule actually penalizes schools for “doing their jobs well” by supporting their student-athletes
and helping them graduate early or on time.15 And most concerning to
these coaches is the specter of a free-agent market. Coaches and schools
have taken notice of the trend in higher-level college basketball schools of
putting together a list ahead of the season of any student-athletes who may be
eligible to transfer as a graduate student.16 And it does not stop there—in
some instances, schools will then contact former coaches of the eligible student-athletes to express their interest in a potential graduate-transfer situation.17 As a result of the potential for collegiate free agency, some coaches
have suggested alterations to the current graduate-transfer rule. One coach
recommended an additional graduate-transfer requirement that schools have
to use a scholarship for graduate transfers for two years, unless the studentathlete actually receives his or her graduate degree in one year.18 Another
coach proposed getting rid of the graduate-transfer rule altogether, suggesting a broad rule for all transfers: “Just have people sit no matter what . . . .
If you transfer, you have to sit a year.”19 Coaches are not the only ones who
are concerned about the more lax transfer rules—some players have spoken
up, as well. Hunter Renfrow, a wide receiver for Clemson’s football team,
expressed his concerns about the rule that would permit Kelly Bryant to
transfer after playing four games this season before being benched.20 Ren14 Id. (quoting a mid-major head coach).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. This recommendation, or at least something very similar to it, was recently proposed as an amendment to the graduate transfer rule by the NCAA’s Transfer Working
Group. This proposal is discussed infra subsection II.A.3.
19 Id. (quoting Southern Illinois coach Barry Hinson). Not all coaches are as harsh
about the graduate transfer rule: University of North Carolina coach Roy Williams said:
“Let’s face it: This is a great rule for the kids and a terrible one for the coaches that lose
these kids. In principle, it’s OK. But it’s not very good for college basketball.” Id. In
general, however, coaches and schools feel that the rule has created trends that have the
potential to harm college athletics.
20 David M. Hale, Clemson’s Hunter Renfrow Frustrated by Redshirt Rule Leading to Transfers, ESPN (Oct. 3, 2018), http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/24871567/
hunter-renfrow-clemson-tigers-frustrated-new-redshirt-transfer-rule. The specific rule Renfrow was referring to can be found in DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, § 12.8.3.1.6, at 83.
This newly adapted rule applies only to football and permits student-athletes to participate
in up to four games in a season without using up one of their seasons of eligibility. Id. As a
senior who had participated in each of his first three seasons, Kelly Bryant would have
exhausted his eligibility had he played five games. But under the new rule, he was able to
claim a redshirt even though he had already played in four games in the 2018 season. That
he could then take advantage of the graduate transfer rule using the year of eligibility he
saved via bylaw 12.8.3.1.6 was perhaps an unintended consequence of the new redshirt
rule. See Alex Kirshner, How Kelly Bryant’s Transfer Works, Thanks to 2 NCAA Rules Working in
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frow’s uneasiness is similar to the free-agency concerns held by college
coaches: “Now Week 4 every year is going to be the trade deadline, and everyone is going to make decisions. I don’t like that part of it. When you commit
to a school, when you commit to a team, that’s your team, right?”21 Thus,
there is widespread concern with removing restrictions on student-athlete
transfers, especially as it pertains to consequences normally associated with
professional sports, such as free-agency and trade deadlines. Meanwhile, the
student-athletes themselves are hoping to achieve a level of freedom that, in
their eyes, would only be fair. One example of a common fairness argument
makes the point that “[a] coach can leave whenever he wants. There’s no
reason a player shouldn’t be able to [transfer and be eligible] right away.”22
Another common fairness comparison is to other, non-athlete students:
“You’re treating the student-athlete different than everybody else on that
campus . . . . Nothing stops the chemistry major from leaving Gonzaga and
going to the University of Washington.”23 And perhaps the most notable
equity concern is that some transfer rules apply only to the revenue-generating sports.24
The variety of opinions surrounding the transfer rules makes clear that
there is no easy solution and the NCAA faces difficulties in shaping these
rules. Well-intentioned proposals may have unintended effects that could
damage student-athletes, the schools they play for, and college sports as a
whole. It is important to lay out the many concerns articulated by college
coaches and schools regarding the graduate-transfer rule because it is likely
that a softening of the undergraduate-transfer rules would result in the same
issues on a broader scale. Thus, the NCAA must inevitably weigh those same
complications as it attempts to form the appropriate rules related to studentathlete transfers in Division I athletics, regardless of whether the transferring
student-athlete is a graduate or undergraduate student. The issue of transfers is one that the NCAA will have to deal with for the foreseeable future. As
student-athletes seek more control over where they play in the interest of
fairness and empowerment, and the concerns of a free agency free-for-all
continue to be asserted by coaches and administrators, the NCAA must navigate the issue of transfer regulation and revision with great care, thought,
and attention to detail.
This Note articulates a normative framework for analyzing NCAA transfer rules, arguing that a balance must be struck between fairness for studentathletes and appropriate restrictions on transfer rules so as to prevent full-on
free agency in collegiate athletics. The Note additionally argues that institutional autonomy over academics is a factor the NCAA must consider along
with fairness and prevention of free agency. This Note will not wade into the
Tandem, SB NATION (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2018/9/
26/17900294/kelly-bryant-transfer-clemson.
21 Hale, supra note 20.
22 Dodd, supra note 12 (second alteration in original).
23 Id.
24 Id.
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complicated waters of potential antitrust issues with the NCAA, nor discuss
the controversial calls for pay-for-play or unionization for student-athletes—
instead, this Note will simply take for granted that it is desirable for the
NCAA to avoid free agency and to maintain the amateuristic aspects of college sports. Part I will review the basics of the NCAA, lay out the current
rules that govern Division I transfers, and discuss the normative structure that
will be used in examining specific proposals and outstanding issues related to
NCAA transfers. Part II analyzes each of four recent proposals by the NCAA
Transfer Working Group to see how well they comport with the normative
framework, and discusses the lurking problems surrounding the one-time
transfer exception. The Note argues that a focus on the common ground
between student-athletes’ interest in fairness and college athletics’ (assumed)
interest in maintaining amateurism should guide the NCAA in shaping its
transfer rules going forward.
I. THE NCAA: A BRIEF OVERVIEW, CURRENT TRANSFER RULES,
AND NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS
A.

Membership, Purpose, and Function

The NCAA was founded in 1906 under the name “Intercollegiate Athletic Association” in order to “draw up competition and eligibility rules for
gridiron football and other intercollegiate sports.”25 The body changed its
name to the current National Collegiate Athletic Association in 1910 and
continued to expand the scope of the sports it governed over time.26 Currently, the NCAA includes over 1100 member universities and colleges,
almost half a million student-athletes, and twenty-four sports.27 Member
schools of the NCAA have been divided into three divisions since 197328:
Divisions I, II, and III.29 This structure is intended to “create[ ] a fair playing
field for like-minded institutions and provide[ ] student-athletes with a wide
spectrum of opportunities.”30
Since this Note focuses primarily on Division I transfers, it will be useful
to go over the membership requirements for Division I institutions. For starters, member schools are permitted to determine for themselves which of the
25 National Collegiate Athletic Association, ENCYCLOPæDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.
britannica.com/topic/National-Collegiate-Athletic-Association (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
26 Id.
27 What Is the NCAA?, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/
ncaa-101/what-ncaa (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
28 See id.; see also National Collegiate Athletic Association, supra note 25.
29 Divisional Differences and the History of Multidivision Classification, NCAA, http://www.
ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership/divisional-differences-and-history-multidivisionclassification (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Multidivision Classification]. This
resource also provides a helpful timeline of the historical development of the multidivisional system of the NCAA, beginning with the creation of the three divisions in 1973.
30 Membership, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
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three divisions they fall into.31 Each of the three divisions creates its own set
of bylaws which must comport with the NCAA’s core values32—thus, a member school simply needs to satisfy the membership requirements of a division
on an annual basis in order to join that division.33 The bylaws for any given
division typically govern a wide variety of categories for member schools and
their sports teams, covering “academic eligibility of student-athletes, amateurism restrictions, recruiting guidelines for coaches and players, financial aid
limits and requirements, athletic department budgetary oversight, and playing and practice season hour requirements.”34 The NCAA Division I Manual
lays out criteria for Division I membership in bylaw 20.9.35 Such requirements include that the school sponsor seven sports each for men and women
(or six for men and eight for women), satisfy minimum requirements for
number of games played against Division I opponents, and meet a minimum
number of financial aid awards for its student-athletes.36 Division I schools
generally have the largest student bodies, the largest athletic budgets, and
the highest number of athletic scholarships available to be given to studentathletes.37 As a result, Division I sports tend to draw the most attention and
generate the most revenue of the three NCAA divisions.38 As far as size goes,
Division I falls in the middle of the three divisions with about 350 Division I
institutions and over 170,000 student-athletes in total,39 compared to about
300 schools and 120,000 student-athletes in Division II and 450 schools and
190,000 student-athletes in Division III.40 Because of the popularity of Divi31 Id.
32 Id.; see also infra note 50 and accompanying text.
33 See Membership, supra note 30.
34 Joseph W. Schafer, Comment, NCAA Division I Transfers “Are Now Basically Screwed”:
The Battle Against the NCAA’s Year in Residence Rule in the Seventh Circuit, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 481,
490 (2018); see also DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, at iii–v (table of contents, showing an
overview of the operating Division I bylaws and reflecting what each article generally covers, such as “Ethical Conduct” in Article 10, “Amateurism and Athletics Eligibility” in Article 12, and “Recruiting” in Article 13).
35 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, § 20.9, at 368.
36 Multidivision Classification, supra note 29. There are additional sport-specific
requirements for Division I member institutions. One such example is that Football Bowl
Subdivision schools must meet a minimum attendance amount over a rolling two-year
period: an average of “15,000 people in actual or paid attendance per home game.” Id.;
DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, § 20.9.9.3, at 376.
37 NCAA Division I, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=D1 (last visited Oct.
18, 2018).
38 See generally NCAA, 2017 FOOTBALL ATTENDANCE (2017), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/
stats/football_records/Attendance/2017.pdf; NCAA, MEN’S BASKETBALL ATTENDANCE 2018
(2019), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/stats/m_basketball_RB/2019/Attendance.pdf; NCAA,
NCAA WOMEN’S BASKETBALL ATTENDANCE RECORDS THROUGH 2017–18 (2019), http://
fs.ncaa.org/Docs/stats/w_basketball_RB/2019/Attendance.pdf.
39 NCAA Division I, supra note 37.
40 See About NCAA Division II, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=D2 (last visited Oct. 18, 2018); Composition and Sport Sponsorship of the NCAA Membership, NCAA (Sept.
2018), https://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership/composition-and-sportsponsorship-ncaa-membership; Division II Facts and Figures, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-4\NDL412.txt

1826

unknown

Seq: 8

notre dame law review

29-MAY-19

15:37

[vol. 94:4

sion I athletics and the revenue that many Division I sports generate—particularly football, men’s hockey, and men’s and women’s basketball41—Division
I transfers draw the most attention. And because of the amount of revenue
generated by those sports, the fanfare associated with them, and their potential for serving as de facto “farm systems” for some professional sports,42 the
NCAA has been cautious in drafting its transfer regulations—and all of its
bylaws—in an attempt to adhere to its stated principles and values, especially
those relating to its stated “Commitment to Amateurism.”43
The NCAA Constitution sets out the purposes and fundamental policy of
the organization.44 In addition to providing the general legislative and structural goals of the Association,45 both the purposes and policies laid out establish the NCAA’s clear and explicit commitment to maintaining an amateur
model of athletics for its member institutions. For example, one stated purpose includes the promotion and development of “athletics participation [at
division-ii-facts-and-figures (last visited Oct. 18, 2018); NCAA Division III, NCAA, http://
www.ncaa.org/about?division=D3 (last visited Oct. 18, 2018).
41 See generally NCAA, REVENUES AND EXPENSES 2004–15: DIVISION I INTERCOLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS PROGRAMS REPORT (2016), http://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4443-division-irevenues-and-expenses-2004-2015.aspx.
42 While Major League Baseball has a robust minor league farm system, the National
Basketball Association (NBA) only has the “NBA G League,” which has not as of yet developed into a legitimate farm system for professional basketball, and the National Football
League and Women’s National Basketball Association do not have any lower developmental leagues. This has led some to brand certain college sports as farm systems for their
professional sport counterparts. See, e.g., Hall v. Univ. of Minn., 530 F. Supp. 104, 109 (D.
Minn. 1982) (“The exceptionally talented student athlete is led to perceive the basketball,
football, and other athletic programs as farm teams and proving grounds for professional
sports leagues.”); Frank Fear, Restructuring D-1 College Basketball as the NBA’s Minor League,
SPORTS COLUMN (Oct. 5, 2017), http://www.thesportscol.com/2017/10/restructuring-d-1college-basketball-as-nbas-minor-league/ (proposing a new format for college basketball
wherein colleges would officially serve as official developmental systems for NBA teams).
Though the controversy surrounding college sports as farm systems is important and interesting, it is outside the scope of this Note to the extent that it goes beyond simply providing
some context to the NCAA’s considerations in forming its transfer rules.
43 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, at Commitments to the Division I Collegiate
Model.
44 Id. §§ 1.1–6.4.2.2, at 1–44. The NCAA Constitution can be found within the Division I Manual in articles 1–6. It covers topics such as the organization’s “purposes and
fundamental policy,” principles for conduct, membership and organization, the NCAA legislative process, and “institutional control.” Id.
45 See id. §§ 1.2(a)–(i), 1.3.2, at 1 (seeking to “initiate, stimulate and improve” college
athletics; upholding the “principle of institutional control”; formulating and publishing of
“rules of play governing intercollegiate athletics”; preserving records; establishing eligibility standards for NCAA athletic events, and “supervis[ing] the conduct” of those events;
legislating “through bylaws or by resolutions . . . upon any subject of general concern to
the [Division I] members related to the administration of intercollegiate athletics”; “establish[ing] standards” allowing member institutions to maintain high-level athletics programs; and finally noting that legislation is intended to cover a variety of areas including
“admissions, financial aid, eligibility and recruiting” and that noncompliant member institutions can be punished by an “infractions process”).
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the intercollegiate level] as a recreational pursuit.”46 Another is to promote
the adoption of eligibility rules by its members “to comply with satisfactory
standards of . . . amateurism.”47 Yet another is to “cooperate with other amateur athletics organizations.”48 And under the “Fundamental Policy” heading, the constitution states the following goal: “A basic purpose of this
Association is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the
educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body
. . . retain[ing] a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics
and professional sports.”49 Thus, a person provided only with article 1 of the
constitution could reasonably conclude that at least one consistent theme
permeating the NCAA’s organization, structure, and actions is a desire to
provide college students with an athletic experience that is fundamentally
different from professional sports.
Further guidance as to the background for the NCAA’s philosophy is
provided in a list of seven “core values” that guides the NCAA and functions
as a mission statement of sorts. Those self-proclaimed core values include a
“belief in and commitment to”: (1) a collegiate model of athletics, (2) the
highest levels of integrity and sportsmanship, (3) the pursuit of excellence in
both academics and athletics, (4) the supporting role that intercollegiate athletics plays in community forming, (5) an inclusive culture, (6) respect for
institutional autonomy and philosophical differences, and finally (7) presidential leadership of intercollegiate athletics.50 The first core value listed,
the “collegiate model of athletics,” is one worth probing further to understand what exactly that model is.51 Fortunately, in its Division I Manual, the
NCAA provides an overview of what its commitment to the “Division I Collegiate Model” means.52 Notably, the first two statements as to what that
commitment means are focused on “[v]alue-[b]ased [l]egislation” and
“[a]mateurism.”53 In seeking to enact value-based legislation, the NCAA
Division I member institutions are to bear in mind an intent to “foster competition in amateur athletics . . . and advance the Collegiate Model” in drafting and enacting bylaws.54
The “Commitment to Amateurism” section focuses on the goal of interweaving intercollegiate athletics as part of a student-athlete’s educational
experience and reiterates the importance of “maintaining a line of demarcation between student-athletes who participate in the Collegiate Model and
athletes competing in the professional model.”55 The remaining sections
46 Id. § 1.2(a), at 1.
47 Id. § 1.2(c), at 1.
48 Id. § 1.2(g), at 1.
49 Id. § 1.3.1, at 1.
50 NCAA Core Values, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/ncaa-core-values (last visited
Oct. 17, 2018).
51 Id.
52 See DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, § 20.9.
53 Id. § 20.9.1.1–.2, at 368.
54 Id. § 20.9.1.1, at 368.
55 Id. § 20.9.1.2, at 368.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-4\NDL412.txt

1828

unknown

Seq: 10

notre dame law review

29-MAY-19

15:37

[vol. 94:4

continue to assert a commitment to an athletic system that is supposed to be
designed in a way that renders participation in intercollegiate athletics “an
integral part of the student-athlete’s effort to acquire a degree in higher education.”56 From all of this, it is clearly the NCAA’s intention to create and
foster a brand of athletic competition for American colleges and universities
that is markedly and clearly distinct from any professional sporting league.
The various purposes, policies, and the “Collegiate Model” in the Division I Manual also speak to a concern for the well-being of student-athletes
and the promotion of not only their physical fitness and participation in
intercollegiate competition, but also their pursuit of an education and a
degree. The Division I Collegiate Model specifically includes a “Commitment to Student-Athlete Well-Being,”57 which presents a variety of principles
to further guide the NCAA in lawmaking. First, Division I athletic programs
are required to be managed in a way that “enhance[s] the well-being of student-athletes” while also ensuring that no outside commercial—or other—
influences “interfere with [the student-athletes’] scholastic, athletics or
related interests.”58 It is also apparent from this particular commitment that
the NCAA desires a system of intercollegiate athletics that, as much as is realistic, allows student-athletes to function as a part of the student body of their
institution and to pursue academic opportunities without any serious hindrance as a result of their playing a Division I sport. More specifically, the
provision includes a call to appropriately limit the amount of time required
for participation in a sport and to create an environment that “encourage[s]
academic success and individual development.”59 Perhaps most importantly,
the NCAA holds out several values as being significant in maintaining a commitment to promoting the interests and success of student-athletes: “fairness,
sportsmanship, safety, honesty and positive relationships between studentathletes and representatives of [their] institution.”60 Thus, the NCAA sets its
sights on a collection of goals that it seeks to promote and effectuate via its
legislation and the enforcement thereof—and (purportedly) two of the most
prominent objectives and considerations that underlie the NCAA’s actions
are maintaining an athletics system modeled upon amateurism and promoting the well-being of Division I student-athletes.
Finally, a brief note on the legislative process by which the NCAA gives
effect to its purposes and goals may be helpful for understanding the way its
56 Id. § 20.9.1.3, at 368. Article II of the Division I Constitution, titled “Principles for
Conduct of Intercollegiate Athletics,” also contains a “Principle of Amateurism” that makes
clear that student-athletes are viewed as amateurs in their respective sports and that their
participation in those sports is an “avocation.” Id. § 2.9, at 4. Article II as a whole contains
even more information covering the purposes and principles that guide the NCAA in serving its role governing intercollegiate athletics.
57 Id. § 20.9.1.6, at 369. The well-being of student-athletes is also emphasized in article
II, which notably includes provisions about fairness and ensuring that student-athletes are
involved “in matters that affect their lives.” Id. § 2.2.6, at 3; see also id. § 2.2.5, at 3.
58 Id. § 20.9.1.6, at 369.
59 Id.
60 Id.
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rules are created and enacted. The bylaws governing the legislative process
appear in article 5 of the NCAA Constitution.61 There are a few different
types of legislative provisions that depend on which group of institutions the
legislation will apply to. First is the “Area of Autonomy” legislation.62 There
are certain areas of legislation where the NCAA permits the so-called “Power
Five” conferences in Division I—the Atlantic Coast Conference, Big Ten Conference, Big 12 Conference, Pac-12 Conference, and Southeastern Conference63—the flexibility to create their own legislation so long as such
legislation comports with the NCAA’s general purposes and principles and
“advance[s] the legitimate educational or athletics-related needs of studentathletes and for legislative changes that will otherwise enhance student-athlete well-being.”64 Area of autonomy legislation is the most narrow in scope,
as the other categories of legislation may apply to only one NCAA division,
multiple divisions, or all institutional members of the NCAA. “Dominant”
provisions are those that apply to all NCAA members,65 while “Division Dominant” provisions apply to all members of any one NCAA division,66 and
“Common” provisions apply to more than one NCAA division and must be
separately adopted by each division.67 Because this Note focuses on Division
I transfer rules, the rules discussed may fall under the umbrella of any one of
these types of legislation. Article 5 of the constitution also provides the procedure for Division I legislation, by which new rules and “amendments to
amendments” can be proposed and accepted.68 Proposed amendments are
posted on the NCAA’s website so that the relevant member institutions can
review them, and those institutions are free at that time to comment on the
61 Id. §§ 5.01–5.4.4.3, at 29–42.
62 Id. § 5.02.1.1, at 29.
63 Pat Forde, Ranking All 65 Power Five Schools in Overall Athletic Success, YAHOO! SPORTS
(July 6, 2017), https://sports.yahoo.com/ranking-every-power-five-school-overall-athleticsuccess-201918295.html.
64 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, § 5.02.1.1, at 29. For more details as to the authority granted by areas of autonomy and the process for legislating within them, see id.
§ 5.3.2.1, at 33–35. The actual areas within which the Power Five conferences are permitted to adopt or amend legislation are as follows: athletics personnel; insurance and career
transition; promotional activities unrelated to athletics participation; recruiting restrictions; preenrollment expenses and support; financial aid; awards, benefits, and expenses;
academic support; health and wellness; meals and nutrition; and time demands. Id.
§ 5.3.2.1.2(a)–(k), at 33–34. The 2018–19 overview of the Division I autonomy legislative
process is available on the NCAA’s website and provides an overview of deadlines along
with some details regarding the general process by which autonomy provisions are proposed, commented on, refined, and ultimately voted on. 2018–19 NCAA Division I Autonomy Legislative Process, NCAA (Sept. 5, 2018), http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/
2018-19DIGov_AutonomyLegislativeProcess_20180906.pdf [hereinafter Autonomy Legislative Process].
65 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, § 5.02.1.2, at 29.
66 Id. § 5.02.1.3, at 29.
67 Id. § 5.02.1.4, at 29.
68 Id. § 5.3.2.1.3.2, at 34.
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proposals.69 Proposals can also be sponsored by one of the Power Five conferences, in the case of autonomy legislation,70 or by the Division I Board of
Directors, Division I Council, or a conference in the case of “Council-Governance” proposals.71 Once the appropriate member institutions and Division I
Council have reviewed the proposals, the Council can vote on those proposals for adoption.72 There are various voting processes by which the proposals
that have made it through the comment and review period must pass
through before adoption, depending on whether they represent legislation
in an autonomy area or Council-governance area and on what kind of rule
the proposal would be creating or amending (dominant, division dominant,
etc.).73 Once a proposal has been accepted for adoption, it will take effect
and become a part of the Division I constitution or bylaws.74 At the outset of
article 5, the NCAA reminds us that all legislation governing member institutions must be “consistent with the purposes and fundamental policy [of the
NCAA]” and must be designed to promote or advance the principles
endorsed by the NCAA.75 It is against this purposive and legislative backdrop
that the NCAA and Division I institutions seek to establish a transfer system
for Division I intercollegiate athletics.

69 Id. § 5.3.2.1.5–.6, at 35, § 5.3.2.2.4–.5, at 36.
70 Id. § 5.3.2.1.3, at 34.
71 Id. § 5.3.2.2.2, at 35. The “Council-governance” areas of legislation are simply those
that fall outside the scope of the areas of autonomy of the Power Five conferences. See
Autonomy Legislative Process, supra note 64 (“Decisions on whether a proposal should be
placed in the [Division I] autonomy legislative process or NCAA Division I Council-governance legislative process are initially determined by NCAA staff . . . .”). The Division I Council (“Council”) is “responsible for the day-to-day decision-making for Division I” and is
made up of athletic directors, administrators, and student-athletes themselves. Division I
Council, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/governance/committees/division-i-council (last visited Nov. 1, 2018). Numerous Division I Committees report and make recommendations
to the Council, including the Division I Legislative Committee. See Division I Committees,
NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/governance/committees?division=d1 (last visited Nov. 1,
2018); Division I Legislative Committee, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/governance/committees/division-i-legislative-committee (last visited Nov. 1, 2018). For more information
about the role the Legislative Committee plays in the legislative process, see id.
72 See DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, § 5.3.2.1.6, at 35, § 5.3.2.2.5–.6, at 36.
73 The voting procedure for proposals in Power Five conference areas of autonomy
can be found in the DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, § 5.3.2.1.7, at 35, while the procedure for Council-governance proposals is located at id. § 5.3.2.2.6, at 36. The voting
requirements for dominant and division dominant proposals are governed by id.
§§ 5.3.7–.3.8, at 38–39.
74 For a more detailed overview of the Division I legislative process, see NCAA, HOW
THE NCAA WORKS: DIVISION I (2018), http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2018DINCAA-HowTheNCAAWorks-DI_20180313.pdf.
75 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, § 5.01.1, at 29.
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Current Division I Transfer Rules

From the Permission-to-Contact Rule to the Notification-of-Transfer
Rule

The NCAA’s current Division I transfer rules recently went through a
major change in the summer of 2018, when the NCAA’s Division I Council
opted to adopt a new rule proposed by the Division I Transfer Working
Group for how the typical initiation of the transfer process would work for
any given student-athlete.76 Historically, Division I student-athletes who
wanted to transfer to another Division I institution had to first obtain written
permission from their current school’s Athletic Director or another athletic
administrator in order to communicate with other schools about potentially
transferring.77 If student-athletes did not first obtain that written permission,
other schools were not permitted to encourage the student-athletes to transfer and could not offer athletically related financial aid “until the studentathlete has attended the second institution for one academic year.”78 Meanwhile, if that written permission was obtained, all of the normally applicable
NCAA recruiting rules applied, meaning that student-athletes seeking to
transfer could then be treated the same as any high-school student being
recruited to play at a Division I school.79 This effectively meant that school
officials could deny student-athletes’ requests for permission to contact certain schools that those school officials did not want the student-athletes to
transfer to, whether for competitive purposes, out of spite, or for some other
reason. As a result, school officials wielded a large amount of control over
where the student-athletes could realistically transfer, given that a lack of permission meant that student-athletes could not be recruited by or communicate with coaches or officials from other schools. Moreover, the transferors
could not receive athletically related financial assistance immediately upon
transferring.
In an effort to bring increased transparency to the transfer process and
to promote fairness,80 the Division I Council adopted the new notification-oftransfer rule in June 2018, which took effect on October 15, 2018, officially
doing away with the longstanding and controversial permission-to-contact
rule.81 The notification-of-transfer rule allows Division I student-athletes to
76 Michelle Brutlag Hosick, New Transfer Rule Eliminates Permission-to-Contact Process,
NCAA (June 13, 2018), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/newtransfer-rule-eliminates-permission-contact-process.
77 Id. This old rule is still reflected in the DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, § 13.1.1.3,
at 97–99. Because the Division I Manual covers the entire 2018–19 academic year, and the
new notification-of-transfer rule did not become effective until October 15, 2018, the Division I Manual includes both the permission-to-contact rule, and the notification-of-transfer
rule (under the “Delayed effective date” heading). Id. § 13.1.1.3, at 97–99.
78 Id.
79 Id. The NCAA Division I recruiting rules can be found at id. §§ 13.01–13.18, at
93–157.
80 See Hosick, supra note 76.
81 See id.
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initiate the transfer process by simply providing his or her school with a written notice of intent to transfer.82 Once the student-athlete has provided that
notification, the school has two days to place the student-athlete’s name and
information on a national transfer database.83 As soon as the student-athlete’s name appears on the transfer database, athletic officials from other
schools are permitted to communicate with the student-athlete about a
potential transfer.84 This is a more straightforward and simplistic process,
and many have viewed it as a positive move in the direction of fairness for
student-athletes. However, this rule does not mean that student-athletes are
completely free to transfer to any school they please; conferences may still
restrict transfers within their own conference,85 and many Division I conferences historically have done so.86 Nonetheless, the notification-of-transfer
rule is a major adjustment to the initiation of the transfer process and gives
Division I student-athletes more control over when and where they can
transfer.
82 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, § 13.1.1.3.1, at 98.
83 Id.
84 Hosick, supra note 76; see also Matt Norlander, NCAA Approves Rule that Ends Coaches’
Ability to Block Transfers, CBS SPORTS (June 13, 2018), https://www.cbssports.com/collegebasketball/news/ncaa-approves-rule-that-ends-coaches-ability-to-block-transfers/ (“College
athletes looking to leave one college for another will no longer have to get consent from
their coach, athletic department or anyone else.”). For a brief overview of the notification
of transfer process directed at potentially transferring student-athletes, see NCAA, NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFER: WHAT DIVISION I STUDENT-ATHLETES SHOULD KNOW (2018), http://
www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/di-saac-notification-transfer.pdf.
85 See Norlander, supra note 84 (“Conferences still have the freedom to enact transfer
restrictions. . . . [S]uch restrictions are common now and prevent athletes from moving
within one conference.”).
86 See Vinnie Duber, Report: Hoosiers, Purdue Among Spike Albrecht’s Transfer Options, NBC
SPORTS (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.nbcsports.com/chicago/big-ten/report-hoosiers-purdue-among-spike-albrechts-transfer-options (discussing how even when a Big Ten Conference men’s basketball coach gave a student-athlete permission to contact other Big Ten
schools, the Big Ten itself was the final decisionmaker as to whether a student-athlete
would be permitted to transfer intraconference); Student-Athlete Handbook: Transfers, U.N.C.
AT CHAPEL HILL ATHLETICS, https://unc_ftp.sidearmsports.com/custompages/pdf/handbook/Transfers.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2018) (citing Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC)
intraconference transfer rule that student-athletes who either were recruited by or received
any athletically related financial aid from their current school must sit out for a year, losing
that season of competition, if the student-athlete transfers to another school in the ACC);
Transfer Student-Athletes, RUTGERS U. ATHLETICS, https://scarletknights.com/sports/2017/
6/11/compliance-transfer-student-athletes-html.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2018) (providing
Big Ten intraconference transfer rule that a student-athlete who has a signed financial aid
agreement with a Big Ten school cannot transfer to another Big Ten school without first
sitting out a year and that the student-athlete loses that year of eligibility, as well as noting
that the “Big Ten intraconference transfer rule supersedes the NCAA transfer regulations”). The Southeastern Conference recently got rid of a rule that forced any graduate
intraconference transfers to sit out one year before competing. See Alex Scarborough,
Under New Rule, SEC Graduates Can Transfer Within the Conference and Play Immediately, ESPN
(June 1, 2018), http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/23670817/under-newrule-sec-graduates-transfer-conference-play-immediately.
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General Overview of the Transfer Process and the Year-in-Residence
Rule

Bearing the new notification-of-transfer rule in mind, the NCAA has
numerous other requirements and rules for transferring student-athletes.
The notification-of-transfer rule is simply one part of the overall process for a
student-athlete currently enrolled at a Division I school seeking to transfer to
another Division I institution. In order to fully complete the transfer process,
the transferring student-athlete must satisfy other requirements, including
applying to the admissions department at the new institution,87 and maintaining continuing eligibility in his or her respective sport (in addition to
maintaining transfer eligibility).
A threshold question is whether the student-athlete qualifies as a “transfer student-athlete.” Meeting any one of a number of conditions will establish that the student-athlete has achieved transfer status, such as (1) being a
full-time student at a two- or four-year college during a nonsummer academic
term, (2) practicing with a college team, or (3) receiving any financial aid
from a college during summer school, among others.88 As a general matter,
student-athletes must also ensure that they will have initial eligibility at the
new institution.89 Meeting the Division I initial eligibility standards involves
taking the requisite number of required high school courses, earning a minimum GPA in those “core courses,” and graduating from high school, among
other requirements.90 Division I student-athletes also are required to register
with the NCAA’s Eligibility Center,91 which is responsible for monitoring
incoming NCAA student-athletes92 for compliance with the NCAA Division I
academic and eligibility standards.93 Once these requirements have been sat87 Even if a student-athlete satisfies the NCAA’s transfer requirements, it does not necessarily mean that he will be able to transfer to another school. Such a transfer still must
meet the academic institution’s own requirements, including academic standards for
acceptance. See NCAA ELIGIBILITY CTR., 2018–19 GUIDE FOR FOUR-YEAR TRANSFERS 7
(2018), http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/TGONLINE42018.pdf.
88 Id. at 6. Additional conditions for being considered a transfer student-athlete can
be found in the Division I Manual. DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, § 14.5.2–.3, at 181–82.
89 NCAA ELIGIBILITY CTR., supra note 87, at 9–13; see also DIVISION I MANUAL, supra
note 4, § 14.3, at 165–97.
90 NCAA ELIGIBILITY CTR., supra note 87, at 10–11. There is an additional requirement
that the student-athlete earn a score on the SAT or ACT that “match[es] [the studentathlete’s] core-course GPA on the Division I sliding scale, which balances test scores and
core-course GPA.” Id. at 11.
91 Id. at 13.
92 Registration with the NCAA Eligibility Center is only required for student-athletes
who are seeking to transfer to Division I and II institutions. Id. Division III NCAA schools
are in charge of setting their own academic and eligibility standards, so any student-athlete
transferring to a Division III school does not need to register with the Eligibility Center.
See id.
93 See NCAA Eligibility Center (Formerly NCAA Clearing House), NAT’L SCHOLASTIC ATHLETICS FOUND., https://www.nationalscholastic.org/ncaa_clearing_house (last visited Nov. 19,
2018) (discussing purpose and role of NCAA Eligibility Center).
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isfied, the student-athlete seeking to transfer may begin the notification-oftransfer process by providing his or her current institution’s compliance
office with a written notification of intention to transfer.94 Once this process
has begun, the student-athlete will be able to transfer to a new school as long
as he meets the new school’s own eligibility standards, and the new school
will need to ensure that the student-athlete has remaining eligibility to participate in an NCAA sport.95 However, simply completing the transfer process to the new school does not mean that the student-athlete will necessarily
be immediately eligible to compete in their respective sport, oftentimes as a
result of the operation of the now-controversial year-in-residence rule.
The year-in-residence rule requires any student-athlete who is transferring from a four-year institution to a Division I school to reside for one full
academic year (either two full semesters or three full quarters) at his or her
new institution before being eligible to participate in actual competition.96
Student-athletes must be enrolled as full-time students during the entirety of
this period or the time sitting out from competition will not contribute
toward satisfying the year-in-residence requirement.97 This required residence year still permits a transferring student-athlete to practice with his
team and to receive financial aid as long as he satisfied the academic requirements when leaving the former institution.98 There are various exceptions to
this requirement that may allow a student-athlete to compete immediately
after transferring,99 including a scenario in which the student-athlete’s current school publicly announces that it will be dropping the sport in which
that student-athlete participates, or where the student-athlete has not partici94 It should be noted that the notification-of-transfer rule only applies to those transferring from a Division I institution. Student-athletes who are seeking to transfer from an
NCAA Division II or III school must still request written permission from an authorized
representative of their institution before contacting or being contacted by a member of
another NCAA school, although the rules differ for student-athletes seeking to transfer
from one Division III school to another. NCAA ELIGIBILITY CTR., supra note 87, at 14–15.
95 In general, at the Division I level, student-athletes have five calendar years to participate in four years of competition. Id. at 21. The five-year period begins to run upon
enrollment as a full-time student at any two- or four-year institution, and it does not stop
until the end of the five years, regardless of any redshirt year, any time the student-athlete
spends sitting out in order to satisfy the year-in-residence requirement, or any time that the
student-athlete takes off from school or is only a part-time student. Id. Student-athletes
are only permitted to compete for a total of four seasons in any one sport and transferring
to a new institution does not reset the total number of years of competition remaining for
the transferring individual. Id.
96 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, § 14.5.5.1, at 185. The NCAA’s stated underlying
purpose behind the rule is to encourage the transferring student-athlete to focus on academics and transitioning to their new school and environment before competing in their
sport. NCAA ELIGIBILITY CTR., supra note 87, at 16.
97 NCAA ELIGIBILITY CTR., supra note 87, at 16.
98 Id.
99 One of most significant of these exceptions, the so-called “one-time transfer exception,” is discussed infra subsection I.B.3.
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pated in the sport for a period of two years.100 The NCAA can waive the
required year out of competition,101 but the NCAA does not comment generally on why waivers are granted or not, and the waiver process has been criticized for inconsistency and a lack of transparency.102 While the year-inresidence rule has been at the center of controversy for years,103 it remains a
significant and important aspect for student-athletes who are considering a
transfer.
3.

The One-Time Transfer Exception

Perhaps the most prominent, and certainly the most well-known, of the
exceptions to the year-in-residence requirement is the one-time transfer
exception.104 The exception permits a student-athlete who is transferring
100 See NCAA ELIGIBILITY CTR., supra note 87, at 18–20.
101 The residence requirement waivers are laid out in DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4,
§ 14.7.2, at 191. It is also possible for student-athletes to be granted a “[h]ardship
[w]aiver” in certain circumstances, wherein they are granted an additional year of competition eligibility. Id. § 12.8.4, at 86–88. Waivers granting immediate eligibility have played
an increasingly significant role in prominent transfers in Division I football in the last few
years. See Stewart Mandel, Justin Fields and the Advent of College Football Free Agency, ATHLETIC
(Feb. 8, 2019), https://theathletic.com/808717/2019/02/08/justin-fields-ohio-state-ncaaimmediate-eligibility-college-football-free-agency/ (discussing the transfer of quarterback
Justin Fields from the University of Georgia to The Ohio State University in 2019, Fields’s
immediate eligibility as a result of a waiver, and how the NCAA’s more flexible approach to
immediate eligibility waivers may create a “new form of free agency” in college football).
102 See Mechelle Voepel, Transfers Remain Tricky but Ever-Growing Part of Women’s College
Basketball, ESPN (Nov. 4, 2017), http://www.espn.com/womens-college-basketball/story/
_/id/21284147/transfers-remain-tricky-growing-part-women-college-basketball (“The
NCAA doesn’t comment on [why transfer student-athletes are granted waivers] . . . .”).
Dawn Staley, the University of South Carolina head women’s basketball coach, had the
following to say about the waiver-granting process: “The waiver thing . . . I really have no
clue how they determine who gets it.” Id. (omission in original). For further discussion
regarding the inconsistency of the NCAA’s granting of waivers, see John Infante, Consistency, Fairness, and Transparency in NCAA Waivers, ATHNET, https://www.athleticscholarships
.net/2013/09/06/consistency-fairness-and-transparency-in-ncaa-waivers.htm (last visited
Nov. 21, 2018).
103 The year-in-residence rule has drawn the ire of numerous commentators. See, e.g.,
Schafer, supra note 34, at 491–96; Joe Nocera, With College Transfer Rules, Hypocrisy Never Sits
Out a Year, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/02/sports/
ncaabasketball/with-college-transfer-rules-hypocrisy-never-sits-out-a-year.html (comparing
fact that student-athletes must sit out a year after transferring but college coaches do not
have to sit out any time when switching jobs); Gary Parrish, It’s Time for the NCAA to Eliminate All Restrictions on D-I Transfers, CBS SPORTS (Sept. 20, 2013), https://www.cbssports
.com/college-basketball/news/its-time-for-the-ncaa-to-eliminate-all-restrictions-on-d-i-transfers/ (criticizing the inconsistency of the waiver process for waiving the year-in-residence
requirement, as well as generally arguing for a more lenient transfer system in NCAA Division I sports); Zachary Zagger, NCAA Transfer Rule Ripe for Reform Despite Court Success,
LAW360 (Mar. 13, 2018), (referencing the year-in-residence rule and the “several lawsuits”
it has been involved in, especially on antitrust grounds).
104 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, § 14.5.5.2.10, at 187.
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from a four-year institution to a Division I school to immediately participate
in competition without sitting out for the normally required one year as long
as: (1) the student-athlete is a participant in any sport other than baseball,
basketball (either women’s or men’s), bowl-subdivision football, or men’s ice
hockey; (2) the student-athlete has not previously transferred from a fouryear institution unless that previous transfer was a result of the previous
school discontinuing or not sponsoring the student-athlete’s sport; (3) the
student-athlete, at the time of transfer, would have been academically eligible
if he remained at the institution from which he is transferring; and (4) the
student-athlete’s prior institution provides written certification that it has no
objection to the student-athlete being granted the exception.105 The operation of the exception is fairly straightforward, but it has come under scrutiny
because of the distinction it creates between the NCAA’s revenue and nonrevenue sports, as student-athletes who compete in any of the sports listed in
(1) above are not able to use this one-time transfer exception to avoid sitting
out a year after transferring. This has led to some suggesting that the
NCAA’s ultimate purpose behind the one-time transfer exception is to prevent “free agency in its most popular and profitable sports.”106 Thus, this
exception is yet another transfer rule that the NCAA must consider as it
strives to balance its own goals related to amateurism with the interests of
student-athletes.
C.

Normative Framework for Approaching the Transfer Problem

The overarching “General Principle” articulated in article 2 of the NCAA
Constitution cautions that in order to best effectuate the NCAA’s purposes
and goals, sometimes “a delicate balance of . . . principles is necessary.”107
The necessity of values balancing is also noted in the “Commitment to ValueBased Legislation” subsection of “Commitments to the Division I Collegiate
Model.”108 As discussed in Section I.A, the NCAA espouses numerous goals
and guiding principles related both to the maintenance of a model of intercollegiate competition that is based upon a foundation of amateurism, and
the creation of a system that adequately serves the interests of the studentathletes. All of article II of the NCAA Division I Constitution is devoted to
articulating those overarching principles, and a quick perusal of the provisions of that article make clear the consistent thread of the general well-being
of student-athletes, equity, and amateurism. Article II also includes a “Principle of Sound Academic Standards,” which requires Division I institutions to
105 Id.
106 Schafer, supra note 34, at 493–94.
107 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, § 2.01, at 3. Article 2 of the NCAA Constitution
specifically covers “Principles for Conduct of Intercollegiate Athletics” and discusses
numerous broader guiding principles including the “Principle of Amateurism,” discussed
supra note 56 and accompanying text. Id. § 2.9, at 4.
108 Id. at Commitments to the Division I Collegiate Model (“In some instances, a careful balancing of these values may be necessary to help achieve the purposes of the
Association.”).
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maintain academic policies and standards consistently for student-athletes
and the general student body alike.109 Commitment to this principle entails
“proper emphasis on educational objectives,” such as graduation, and necessitates that collegiate athletic programs “be maintained as an important component of the educational program.”110 It is clear from the Division I
Manual and NCAA Division I Constitution that the organization views these
values as fundamental; thus, any rules or laws passed to govern NCAA Division I institutions should be carefully crafted by the Division I Council with
such principles in mind. One should read the NCAA transfer regulations
against that backdrop, and as a result, it is useful to establish a framework
within which one can analyze the efficacy of the rules in light of the guiding
principles of fairness to student-athletes, amateurism, and institutional academic control in Division I athletics. My goal here is not to critique or assess
whether the NCAA ought to pursue or endorse amateurism, but rather to
establish and utilize a framework that will help in determining whether a
transfer rule, enacted or proposed, comports with and promotes these guiding principles.
As far as amateurism goes, in the context of transfer rules, one of the
most significant concerns that bears on the NCAA and Division I institutions’
minds is the potential for a free-agent market of transferring student-athletes.
Free agency, as typically defined, inherently connotes professionalism—for
instance, Merriam-Webster defines the term as “a professional athlete . . .
who is free to negotiate a contract with any team.”111 And college coaches
have long voiced significant concerns with the potential of creating a freeagent market if the transfer rules are too lax. Scott Frost, head coach of the
University of Nebraska football program, reacted negatively to the prospect
of a no-restriction transfer system: “I think there’s been some proposals to
make transfers free and never have to sit out. . . . [T]hat would be a disaster. . . . I think that’d get messy and ugly.”112 The notion that a form of free
agency would threaten amateurism in college sports cannot be neatly tied to
any one particular concern, but some seem to stand out—namely, coaches’
fears that free agency will undermine both the stability of their rosters and
programs,113 and also that it would encourage student-athletes to quit when
the going gets tough when those coaches instead would want to see their
players grow through adversity. Various prominent coaches have been vocal
about the perceived negative impact that free agency would have on intercol109 Id. § 2.5, at 4.
110 Id. § 20.9.1.7, at 369.
111 Free Agent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
free%20agent (last visited Nov. 23, 2018).
112 Dodd, supra note 12 (second omission in original); see also Gary Parrish, Potential
Change to Transfer Rule has College Coaches Spooked, Hypocritically, CBS SPORTS (Sept. 7, 2017),
https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/potential-change-to-transfer-rule-hascollege-coaches-spooked-hypocritically/ (quoting University of Alabama head football
coach Nick Saban as saying: “How can you plan a roster or a team when every player is a
free agent at the end of the season?”).
113 Dodd, supra note 12 (“Coaches are concerned about roster management.”).
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legiate athletics—for example: “If we open this up, where it’s free agency, it’s
going to change everything about our sport, which will be bad . . . . That part
will be bad.”114 Another said: “There’s gotta be something [to ease the transfer restrictions] . . . . Just so it doesn’t become free agency in college football.
That’s the thing I would worry about.”115 The list goes on.116 There also
seems to be a concern with the integrity of recruiting, an issue the NCAA
cares deeply about, as coaches have expressed worries that a no-holds-barred
transfer regime would encourage other schools to engage in suspect recruiting efforts of potential transfer student-athletes.117 One commentator has
specifically written about another potential implication of allowing a restrictionless transfer system: unionization by student-athletes in an effort to protect their rights against the NCAA.118 Such a result would go against the
NCAA’s insistence that student-athletes are to be viewed primarily as students: “Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and
their participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the
physical, mental and social benefits to be derived.”119 It is neither an unreasonable nor implausible narrative that the loosening or relaxing of the
NCAA’s Division I transfer guidelines could lead to something akin to, if not
indistinguishable from, free agency.120 And a free-agency system could certainly contribute to the deterioration of the model of amateurism that the
NCAA wants to preserve, especially given the desire of the NCAA to maintain
the (inaccurate or accurate) view of student-athletes as students, first and
foremost. Permitting student-athletes to transfer without restriction could
permit them to focus on a potential transfer decision with respect to athletics
114 Matt Tait, Self Against the Idea of ‘Free Agency’ as NCAA Explores Changes to Transfer
Rules, KUSPORTS.COM (Sept. 19, 2017), http://www2.kusports.com/news/2017/sep/19/
self-against-idea-free-agency-ncaa-explores-change/.
115 Barrett Sallee, Michigan Coach Jim Harbaugh Details Concern About ‘Free Agency’ in College Football, CBS SPORTS (Apr. 29, 2018), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/
news/michigan-coach-jim-harbaugh-details-concern-about-free-agency-in-college-football/.
116 See generally Evan Daniels, NCAA Coaches Loudly Speaking Out on Potential Transfer
Rule, 247SPORTS (Sept. 6, 2017), https://247sports.com/college/basketball/recruiting/
Article/NCAA-coaches-loudly-speaking-out-on-potential-transfer-rule—107036402/; Dodd,
supra note 12; Parrish, supra note 112.
117 See Daniels, supra note 116 (“‘It would turn into one of the dirtiest recruiting periods that you’ve ever seen,’ [said] Indiana coach Archie Miller . . . . ‘Coaches will recruit
players right after games and now you can go directly to the source, it would cripple teams
and programs.’”).
118 Matthew R. Cali, Comment, The NCAA’s Transfer of Power: An Analysis of the Future
Implications the Proposed NCAA Transfer Rules Will Have on the Landscape of College Sports, 21
JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 217, 240 (2014) (“Once student-athletes realize their power
to freely transfer schools, just as a free agent does in professional leagues, they will decide
to band together as a cohesive unit to protect their rights from being infringed upon and
fight for more rights.”); see id. at 220, 240–44.
119 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, § 2.9, at 4.
120 See Mandel, supra note 101 (arguing that the “NCAA’s rapidly loosening restrictions
on transfers” will lead to an “opening [of] the floodgates” and a “free-agency frenzy”).
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only, especially when the student-athlete aspires to later play his sport in a
professional league.121
The NCAA wants its student-athletes to focus on achieving a college
degree: “Member institutions shall conduct their athletics programs for students who choose to participate in intercollegiate athletics as a part of their
educational experience . . . thus maintaining a line of demarcation between
student-athletes who participate in the Collegiate Model and athletes competing in the professional model.”122 Therefore, it would hardly be palatable
for the organization to encourage the enactment of legislation that could or
would threaten the integrity of its model of competition. Thus, whether a
transfer rule will significantly encourage free agency can serve as a proxy for
analyzing how such a rule may impact amateurism.
Great mental leaps are not required to understand the importance and
interest the NCAA and its member schools have in promoting fairness to
student-athletes. Treating others with fairness and equality is a paramount
goal (or at least ought to be) of humanity in general. As the organization
that effectively governs the eligibility and participation of student-athletes in
collegiate athletics, the NCAA has a responsibility to keep the general welfare
of its student-athletes in mind whenever it creates rules that can have a
profound impact on those student-athletes during an important developmental period in their lives. As previously noted, the organization recognizes this
obligation throughout the Division I Manual, as is particularly apparent in
the sections on the Division I Collegiate Model and the NCAA’s purpose and
guiding principles.123 More specifically, the “Principle of Student-Athlete
Well-Being” calls out the importance of supporting student-athletes’ educational experiences, protecting their health, and involving them in matters
that affect their lives.124 The “Commitment to Student-Athlete Well-Being”
also encourages an environment that promotes “academic success and individual development” for student-athletes, as well one that “fosters
fairness.”125
Another important principle is that of equity. Equity is specifically mentioned in both the “Principle of Competitive Equity” in the Division I Constitution—which states the goal of promoting equal opportunities for studentathletes so that they are not “prevented unfairly from achieving the benefits
121 The NCAA is careful to make its student-athletes aware of how difficult it is to make
it into professional sports, directly contrasting the statistics of participation in professional
athletics with those of graduating with a degree from Division I institutions, thus continuing to reinforce its view that student-athletes are students seeking a degree first and athletics second. See Estimated Probability of Competing in Professional Athletics, NCAA, http://www.
ncaa.org/about/resources/research/estimated-probability-competing-professional-athletics (last visited Nov. 23, 2018).
122 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, § 20.9.1.2, at 368; see also id. § 1.3.1, at 1.
123 These sections are discussed in greater detail supra notes 44–60 and accompanying
text.
124 See DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, § 2.2.1–.6, at 3.
125 Id. § 20.9.1.6, at 369.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-4\NDL412.txt

1840

unknown

Seq: 22

notre dame law review

29-MAY-19

15:37

[vol. 94:4

inherent in participation in intercollegiate athletics”126—and the “Commitment to Diversity and Inclusion,” which articulates equity as a core value of
the NCAA.127 In the context of transfer rules, student-athletes have a significant interest in where they attend school for a variety of reasons: proximity to
family and friends, academics, sports, and feel or fit, to name just a few. Any
rule that restricts a student-athlete’s ability to transfer to another program
inherently takes away from that student-athlete’s autonomy to control both
where he gets an education and where he plays his sport, regardless of the
reason that the restriction exists. As a result, it is important that the NCAA
and Division I rulemakers consider the impact that such transfer restrictions
have on student-athletes as individuals, not just the impact those restrictions
will have on college sports as a whole.
One such consideration is an equity comparison between student-athletes at Division I institutions and their nonathlete classmates. Many have
questioned why student-athletes—particularly those in the revenue-generating sports who are considering the one-time transfer exception—are treated
differently than other students at the same school. As Bill Self, head coach of
the University of Kansas men’s basketball team, put it: “If you’re an engineering student at Kansas and you want to go to Missouri, you just go.”128 This
difference becomes especially glaring when a situation arises that could cause
a regular student to seek a transfer, such as becoming homesick, developing
career goals that are more favorable by being in a certain region, or having
difficulty adjusting to life at the initial school. In such a situation, the regular
student can transfer wherever they are accepted into another institution.
Student-athletes, meanwhile, must satisfy all NCAA requirements for transfer
if they wish to continue competing at the Division I level. And even if they do
meet these requirements, many of them will have to wait an entire year to
compete. In fact, if the NCAA is primarily concerned with the graduation of
its student-athletes and their attainment of college degrees, it can be argued
that those student-athletes ought to have an appropriate level of control over
where they are earning their degree.
For example, one can imagine a situation where a college basketball
player, upon realizing that making the NBA or WNBA is not especially realistic, wants to earn a degree in a certain program that that student-athlete’s
current institution does not offer. But that student-athlete must generally sit
out a year from participating in competition if he or she transfers to a different school. This creates an obvious asymmetry between student-athletes and
regular students, which calls into question the NCAA’s assertion that the
organization wants student-athletes to be “an integral part of the student
body” with a “clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and
professional sports.”129
126
127
128
129

Id. § 2.10, at 4.
Id. § 20.9.1.9, at 369.
Tait, supra note 114.
DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, § 1.3.1, at 1.
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Simply looking at the difference in the transfer rules for regular students
versus student-athletes might lead one to argue, instead, that there is actually
a clear line of demarcation between those regular students and student-athletes. As one school administrator has said: “You’re treating the student-athlete different than everybody else on that campus.”130 While student-athletes
may have access to certain benefits that regular students do not, the question
becomes: Just how far is it fair to restrict transfer student-athletes in the name
of maintaining amateurism?
Further equity concerns arise when coaches are brought into the mix.
First of all, coaches are (subject to their own contract limitations) free to
leave a school and coach at another. The NCAA does not levy any penalty on
those coaches for switching schools.131 Thus, there is an inequity between
coaches and players in NCAA Division I sports. While this asymmetry could
be justified on the grounds that coaches are employees and the NCAA strictly
enforces the view that student-athletes are nothing of the sort, it does create
problems when the very coaches who recruited players leave that school.132
If the student-athlete loses the person they were not only recruited by
but perhaps feel most comfortable with at the school, that student-athlete
may feel justified in seeking a transfer, especially if there were other options
that were preferable for some other reason like geography, academics, or
family. This asymmetry creates further equity concerns on behalf of potential transfer student-athletes. Accounting for this variety of considerations,
the NCAA must analyze the potential pitfalls of any transfer rule on studentathletes’ well-being and their ability to have the autonomy and empowerment
to make the decisions that they deem best for themselves. At the heart of this
analysis must be fairness, with the goal being to strike a balance between the
interests the NCAA has in reasonably restricting transfers so as to prevent
full-on free agency in college sports and the interests student-athletes have in
being involved in “matters that affect their lives,”133 to use the NCAA’s own
language.
Finally, an oft-neglected consideration in shaping the NCAA transfer
rules is that of institutional autonomy over academics. The manner in which
a Division I institution structures its admission standards, academic progression, and graduation or degree requirements may implicitly be impacted by
any rule controlling student-athlete transfers, especially when considering
how important athletics can be at numerous Division I schools. As a baseline,
institutions must be able to have full autonomy over their academic pro130 Dodd, supra note 12.
131 See Parrish, supra note 112 (discussing how coaches at smaller Division I schools
often move up to higher level programs when the opportunity arises, without penalty, and
arguing that student-athletes should be permitted to do the same).
132 See Dodd, supra note 12 (“When you go to the school, it’s the coaches that come out
to recruit you [to] bring you to that school . . . . You want to pick the school for the school,
but [the coach is] where you go to for your help if you’re struggling. You want to talk to
your coach. That’s who you’re most comfortable with.” (second alteration in original)).
133 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, § 2.2.6, at 3.
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grams, especially if the NCAA is to maintain that the role of the studentathlete at Division I programs is student first and athlete second. Clearly,
institutions have an immense interest in structuring their own courses of
study, degree requirements, and general academic standards. When transfer
rules begin encroaching on that basic institutional control, they threaten to
have a vastly more far-reaching impact than simply that of how and when
student-athletes may transfer and when those student-athletes will have athletic eligibility. Again, the NCAA requires its Division I member institutions
to place “proper emphasis on educational objectives,”134 a goal that will be
substantially hindered if schools are essentially encouraged by transfer rules
to alter academic programs in order to promote athletics. And institutions
are cognizant of this goal—as Rev. John Jenkins, president of the University
of Notre Dame, has stated, “[o]ur relationship to these young people is to
educate them.”135 Jenkins further articulated the precedence that academics
ought to take over athletics: “[Schools are] educational institution[s], and
athletics, while diverting and instructive in its own right, is meant to serve the
educational purpose.”136 This view comports with the NCAA’s own guideline
that “[i]ntercollegiate athletic programs shall be maintained as an important
component of the educational program.”137 With these principles in mind,
it is important for the NCAA to design its transfer rules in a way that avoids
forcing institutions to make certain academic decisions that they would not
otherwise make. This does not necessarily require that the transfer rules
actually promote institutional autonomy—only that the rules do not impede the
inherent control that institutions must be able to have over academics. Thus,
institutional autonomy is a third major element for the NCAA to weigh when
it is crafting its transfer rules.
In light of the importance to the NCAA of amateurism and student-athlete well-being, and the value of academic autonomy to institutions, a threepronged balancing analysis serves as the most useful and appropriate
approach in determining whether a transfer rule is sensical and tailored to
serving the NCAA’s goals without going so far as to unfairly restrict studentathletes in making important life decisions for themselves. Thus, when taking a closer look at an existing or proposed transfer rule for NCAA Division I
sports, one should ask the following questions: (1) is the rule tailored in a
way that it can be reasonably expected to prevent the creation of a free
agency that might threaten the model of amateurism that the NCAA seeks to
maintain; (2) is the rule fair to student-athletes, or does it impose a burden
on student-athletes that is not commensurate with or exceeds the NCAA’s
concern and interest in maintaining that amateur model; and (3) does the
134 Id. § 20.9.1.7, at 369.
135 Dan Barry, Notre Dame President Stands Firm Amid Shifts in College Athletics, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/11/sports/ncaafootball/notredame-president-stands-firm-amid-shifts-in-college-athletics.html.
136 Id.
137 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, § 20.9.1.7, at 369.
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rule unreasonably influence the control institutions have in terms of academic standards and requirements?
II. APPLYING

THE

FRAMEWORK: RECENT TRANSFER PROPOSALS
FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

AND

A.

Applying the Framework to Recent Transfer Rule Proposals

The NCAA’s Transfer Working Group (TWG) recently proposed four
new transfer rules or amendments to be considered in the 2018–19 NCAA
legislative cycle.138 In Section II.A, this Note analyzes each of the four proposals under the above-suggested framework to give an idea of the analysis
that this Note recommends when attempting to assess the strength and efficacy of various transfer rules and proposals for serving the dual purposes of
promoting an amateur model of intercollegiate athletics and accounting for
fairness to student-athletes, without interfering with institutional autonomy.
1.

Proposal I

The first proposal is the one that seems most likely to get attention, as it
pertains directly to one of the most common arguments against the current
Division I transfer rules. If enacted, the rule would permit a student-athlete,
who already enrolled in summer school at his institution and who has
received athletics financial aid, to transfer, if his head coach leaves the school
for any reason before the first day of fall classes, provided that he has not
previously enrolled as a full-time student in a regular term at a collegiate
institution.139 The stated rationale for this rule indicates that the TWG feels
that the rule would be “fair and promote[ ] student-athlete well-being.”140
Applying the first prong of the framework, we ask whether the proposed
rule is crafted such that it can be reasonably expected to prevent free agency.
This rule is more geared toward lessening some of the harshness of the yearin-residence rule in a specific but not uncommon circumstance: however, the
NCAA must still consider the potential impact that loosening the traditional
transfer restrictions in this manner may have on amateurism. In the case of
this proposal, it seems unlikely that the rule would operate in a way that
would encourage the wave of transfers that a broader rule might. Importantly, it generally seems to be the case that college coaches are either fired
or choose to take a new job well in advance of the summer term since, for
most sports, the season ends before the summer term begins. And in most
138 Michelle Brutlag Hosick, DI Council Introduces Transfer Legislation, NCAA (Oct. 5,
2018), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/di-council-introducestransfer-legislation.
139 NCAA Division I Council, Transfer Working Group, Academic Eligibility—Exceptions
for Transfers from Four-Year Colleges—Head Coach Departure Prior to Initial Full-Time Enrollment
Exception (NCAA Proposal No. 2018-104, 2018), https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/proposalView?id=103292 [hereinafter Division I Proposal 2018-104] (proposing to amend section 14.5.5.2); see Hosick, supra note 138.
140 Division I Proposal 2018-104, supra note 139.
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cases, schools would likely prefer to have a new coach installed as soon as
possible. A coach leaving abruptly before the fall semester starts would be
the exception rather than the rule. Additionally, this rule would not broadly
impact all Division I sports. Rather, it would apply to student-athletes participating in one of the revenue sports: baseball, men’s ice hockey, basketball, or
football.
But eligible student-athletes in other Division I sports have the option of
the one-time transfer exception for their first transfer. Since this proposed
exception to the year-in-residence rule would only be available for studentathletes who have not enrolled full-time before, in general any student-athlete participating in a nonrevenue sport would have the one-time transfer
exception available to transfer for any reason, including if their coach left
and they wanted to transfer as a result of that.141 Thus, as a general matter
the use of this proposed rule would be less common for nonrevenue sport
student-athletes, which limits the overall pool of potential transfers.142 As a
result, the NCAA and its Division I institutions need not have great concern
that enacting this proposal would lead to a significant increase in the number
of student-athletes transferring between Division I schools due to their
coaches leaving before the beginning of the fall term. It follows that this
proposal would not seriously threaten the NCAA’s desired model of
amateurism.
Applying the second prong, we ask whether this proposal is fair to student-athletes. Again, this rule was proposed with student-athlete well-being
in mind, and was targeted at a specific issue that has been at the forefront of
arguments in favor of relaxing the Division I transfer restrictions: the departure of a coach.143 This prong is satisfied in this case. Because revenue sport
student-athletes do not have the one-time transfer exception available to
them, this proposal gives them the option to transfer without having to sit out
if the coach who recruited them leaves before they actually enroll full-time at
the school. As the TWG articulates in its rationale for the proposal, “[t]he
head coach is a major variable in the recruitment process and the choice a
student-athlete makes regarding where to attend college and participate in
athletics.”144 If a head coach leaves before the student-athlete even has time
to settle in at his new school, that student-athlete may have lost one of the
most, if not the most, significant reasons for choosing that school. This pro141 Recall, however, that one of the requirements for use of the one-time transfer
exception is that the student-athlete’s prior institution provide written approval of the
grant of the exception. See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text. Thus, while student-athletes participating in nonrevenue sports have the one-time transfer exception
available, they will not always necessarily be granted an exception. As a result, this proposed rule could be used by a nonrevenue student-athlete whose school denied their onetime transfer exception but whose coach left before the fall semester began.
142 See Transfer Rate Averages and Trends, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources
/research/transfer-rate-averages-and-trends (last visited Nov. 24, 2018) (reflecting the
transfer rates for Division I sports in 2017).
143 See e.g., Dodd supra note 12; Parrish supra note 112.
144 Division I Proposal 2018-104, supra note 139.
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posed rule seems like a natural, obvious, and fair solution to this issue—
rather than essentially punishing a student-athlete for choosing a school and
then having the head coach who recruited him leave for reasons completely
out the student-athlete’s control, it provides student-athletes who have not
had time to develop a comfort zone or other reasons to stay an option to
transfer to a school that is a better fit without incurring the year out of
competition.
Finally, in applying the third prong, the question is whether the proposed rule would unreasonably impede institutional autonomy over academic programs. This first proposal does not seem to have any significant
bearing on this prong of the analytical framework. This proposal does not
appear to create any real incentive for institutions to alter their academic
programs or degree requirements for athletics purposes. As a result, if
enacted, the rule does not seem as though it would seriously threaten institutional autonomy. Thus, this proposal, having applied the framework,
appears sound under all three prongs and strikes an effective balance
between fairness to student-athletes and maintaining enough control over
transfers so as to not create a free-agent frenzy.
2.

Proposal II

The TWG’s second proposed amendment would create another exception to the year-in-residence rule, so long as the transferring student-athlete
satisfies one of two conditions: (1) the student-athlete was not recruited by
the previous institution, which does not provide athletically related financial
aid in the sport; or (2) the student-athlete was a walk-on (did not receive any
athletically related financial aid) at the previous institution, which provides
athletically related financial aid in that sport.145 This proposal is, like the
one discussed above, targeted at fairness to student-athletes, as the TWG’s
rationale articulates that nonrecruited or nonscholarship student-athletes
“should be permitted to explore other athletics and academic opportunities
without being required to fulfill an academic year of residence at another
institution” after transferring.146
Beginning with the first prong of the analytical framework, it might be
useful to consider the total number of walk-ons and nonrecruited studentathletes in Division I sports. While available statistics regarding the number
of nonrecruited Division I student-athletes are sparse, recent data from the
NCAA suggest that roughly forty-one percent of student-athletes in Division I
athletics programs do not receive any athletically related financial aid, and
thus can be classified as “nonscholarship” student-athletes within the mean145 NCAA Division I Council, Transfer Working Group, Academic Eligibility—Exceptions
for Transfers from Four-Year Colleges—Nonrecruited or Nonscholarship Exception (Proposal No.
2018-103, 2018), https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/proposalView?id=103296 [hereinafter Division I Proposal 2018-103] (proposing to amend section 14.5.5.2); see Hosick, supra
note 138.
146 Division I Proposal 2018-103, supra note 145.
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ing of this proposed rule.147 That is a substantial number of student-athletes,
representing about 73,000 individuals. Thus, unlike the first proposal, the
potential pool of transfer student-athletes being impacted by this proposal is
fairly significant. Nonetheless, the NCAA and Division I schools still could be
fairly confident that enacting this exception would not have a substantially
deleterious effect on amateurism and no free-agent market would result.
The predominant reason for this is that the concerns about recruiting student-athletes who are still at other schools would be significantly lower, as in
most cases, nonscholarship and nonrecruited student-athletes are not the
ones who would be most highly sought after. If a student-athlete is very talented or noticed when in high school, it is very likely that Division I schools
would both recruit and provide him with athletically related scholarships.
Nonscholarship and nonrecruited student-athletes also can earn athletically
related scholarships later in their academic careers,148 which would take
them outside the scope of this exception and would alleviate concerns about
recruitment of potential transfer student-athletes by other institutions. Further, and perhaps more significantly, because nonscholarship and
nonrecruited athletes are not incentivized to attend an institution because of
athletically related financial aid or recruitment, these student-athletes generally will select schools that are better suited to their needs and desires for
reasons other than athletics. As a result, it is reasonable to conclude that this
class of Division I student-athletes may be less likely to transfer than would
scholarship or recruited student-athletes, alleviating some of the concerns
that this proposed amendment would lead to increased free agency in college sports. Thus, this second proposal appears to generally comport with
the amateur model.
On the fairness front, this proposal, like the first, would provide certain
student-athletes with more flexibility and control in transfer situations. The
initial question one might ask could be: What justifies granting this exception
from sitting out a year to nonrecruited and nonscholarship student-athletes,
but not to other student-athletes? The proposal does make sense in light of
the commitment that scholarship and recruited student-athletes and their
institutions make to one another. When Division I schools recruit studentathletes, they are demonstrating an interest in that individual both athletically and academically. And when those schools actually offer athletically
related financial aid to student-athletes, the institutions are demonstrating a
commitment to help pay for the student-athletes’ education and other
expenses. When student-athletes accept such aid, they are also committing
to that institution to some extent.
Nonscholarship and nonrecruited student-athletes are not tied to institutions in quite the same way—while they are just as much a part of any Divi147 See NCAA, NCAA RECRUITING FACTS (2018), https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/
files/Recruiting%20Fact%20Sheet%20WEB.pdf.
148 See Tom VanHaaren, Best of Walk-On Scholarship Reveals, ESPN (Aug. 21, 2018),
http://www.espn.com/sportsnation/story/_/id/24435943/best-walk-scholarship-reveals
(providing videos of former walk-on student-athletes being granted a scholarship).
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sion I athletics program as a scholarship or recruited student-athlete is, the
school has not demonstrated the same degree of commitment to the class of
individuals targeted by this proposal. Because the schools do not have the
same financial commitment to these walk-on student-athletes, it appears only
fair to allow such student-athletes to transfer schools without having to sit out
for a year in residence, especially considering that walk-ons may have made
their decision on what school to attend primarily for reasons other than athletics. All things considered, while one could argue that the distinction
between walk-ons and scholarship or recruited student-athletes does not justify granting one group this exception but not the other, this proposal is still
a move in the right direction for fairness and in the interest of student-athlete well-being in the Division I transfer context.
In terms of institutional autonomy, this proposal, like the first, does not
put Division I institutions in a difficult position regarding the structure of
academic programs. The category of student-athletes targeted by this proposal have not received any financial commitment from the institution. It thus
appears that institutions do not have any special reason to tailor academic
standards or programs in a way that will best suit the transfer proposal here.
As a whole, this proposal seems reasonably designed to increase fairness to at
least some student-athletes without creating any significant risk of free
agency, and it avoids obstructing institutions’ ability to control their
academics.
3.

Proposal III

The third proposal targets the graduate-transfer rule in basketball and
football specifically. The proposal’s intent reads as follows:
In [either men’s or women’s] basketball and football, to specify that a
graduate transfer student-athlete who receives athletically related financial
aid and enrolls at the certifying institution with one season of eligibility
remaining shall be a counter for two academic years; further, to specify that
if a graduate transfer student-athlete successfully completes all degree
requirements prior to the start of his or her second academic year of enrollment, he or she shall not be considered a counter for the subsequent academic year.149

Essentially, the idea behind this rule is to discourage free agency of graduate transfers by imposing a penalty on Division I institutions in the form of
counting any graduate transfer’s scholarship against the total number of
scholarships a Division I basketball or football team has for two full years,
even if the graduate transfer runs out of eligibility after only one season,
unless that student-athlete achieves his or her degree before the second year.
149 NCAA Division I Council, Transfer Working Group, Financial Aid—Maximum Institutional Grant-in-Aid Limitations by Sport—Counters—Basketball and Football—Graduate Transfers
(Proposal No. 2018-106, 2018), https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/proposalView?id=103298 [hereinafter Division I Proposal 2018-106] (proposing to amend section 15.5.1); see also Hosick, supra note 138.
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Unlike the first two proposals, this one was made with the free-agency concerns related to graduate transfers in mind.150 Indeed, the TWG’s rationale
for the proposal notes the growing number of graduate transfers and states
that it “seeks to achieve greater institutional accountability” while also promoting student-athlete well-being.151
The analysis for the first prong of the framework is straightforward for
this proposal, as it appears clear enough that the operation of the rule would
work to prevent or at least somewhat mitigate the free-agency concerns that
come along with the graduate-transfer rule. Because basketball and football
have two of the highest number of graduate transfers in Division I annually,152 this proposal is aimed at the sports that Division I schools are most
likely to seek to capitalize on by using the graduate-transfer rule. As the
transfer rules currently stand, the graduate-transfer rule provides perhaps the
closest thing to a limitless transfer system that could lead to free agency, since
graduate student-athletes who retain eligibility are free to transfer without
any NCAA restrictions on their ability to play immediately. Recall, though,
that Division I conferences can restrict intraconference transfers. The growing number of graduate transfers, as previously discussed,153 has created a
bona fide concern that Division I schools will compile lists of prospective
transfer student-athletes and begin recruiting those potential transfers before
the actual transfer process has begun.
As student-athletes in basketball and football utilize the graduate-transfer rule to compete at a new school for their final season of eligibility at
increasing rates, it becomes difficult to draw the line between a pure system
of free agency and transferring graduate student-athletes. As it currently
stands, graduate student-athletes can basically make their previous institution
aware that they intend to transfer, and then can go visit new schools and be
recruited without any real limitation. Again, I am not assessing whether or
not this is a good thing—I am simply taking for granted that amateurism is a
desirable quality of NCAA Division I sports, and that permitting full-on free
agency could hinder the goal of maintaining an amateur model. With that
said, if left untouched, it is plausible that the graduate-transfer rule could
create a free-agent market of sorts for graduate student-athletes. This proposal would make Division I institutions think harder about going all out in
their pursuit of graduate transfers, as they would have to consider the impact
that adding a graduate transfer would have on their total number of scholarships available if that graduate transfer did not earn a degree within one year
of transferring. Having a scholarship count against the total number available, when the student-athlete for whom the scholarship was given cannot
even compete, would be something that a school would have to seriously
weigh. It would be an effective deterrent to schools that might otherwise
150 The graduate-transfer rule, and some of the concerns and issues surrounding it, are
discussed supra notes 9–20 and accompanying text.
151 Division I Proposal 2018-106, supra note 149.
152 Prevalence of Graduate Transfer in Division I, supra note 8.
153 See supra notes 9–20 and accompanying text.
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seek to add as many graduate transfers as possible, and as currently proposed, it is tailored to serve the goal of controlling or mitigating the potential
for free agency that could damage the amateur model as a result of the graduate-transfer rule.
Assessing the fairness prong is interesting for this proposal, because
unlike the previous two proposals, it does not directly bear on student-athletes’ ability to control their transfers. Certainly, if enacted, the proposal
could indirectly make it more difficult for graduate student-athletes to transfer in the sense that it would probably make schools think twice before
adding a graduate transfer. On the flip side, though, the proposal would
encourage the schools to help the student-athlete finish the requirements for
his graduate degree in an expeditious manner, since the graduate transfer’s
scholarship will not count against the school’s total if the student-athlete
completes all degree requirements before his second year of enrollment.
Additionally, the rule does not directly limit or restrict student-athletes’ ability to transfer, as the graduate-transfer rule itself is still in play and would be
able to be utilized even if the proposal were enacted. Ultimately, this proposal seems like a creative way to curb the potential trend toward free agency
for graduate transfers without seriously hampering the well-being of those
student-athletes, and perhaps in some ways it actually encourages fairness
and the educational success of those student-athletes.
The third prong, however, is where this proposal raises concerns.
Unlike the previous two proposals, this proposal creates a significant risk of
inhibiting institutional autonomy in the academic context. Again, this rule
would effectively create a penalty for institutions if they take on a graduate
transfer in football or basketball and that graduate transfer does not satisfy
degree requirements before the beginning of the second academic year of
enrollment. It is not difficult to see how the existence of this scholarship
penalty could incentivize schools to take measures to avoid the penalty at the
expense of ordinary academic objectives. For example, one major concern
would be that schools could seek to establish one-year graduate programs or
one-year certificate programs that they would not otherwise have created.
Graduate transfers could enroll in those programs, satisfy the requirements
for the certificate or degree in one year, and then the school would not have
to count the student-athlete’s scholarship for the second year.
This is perhaps as clear an example of interference with institutional
autonomy as there could be in the context of transfer regulations. If a school
creates an entire program or course of study that can be finished within a
year directly as a result of a transfer rule that governs student-athletes, the
school is not acting with pure autonomy—it is being implicitly guided by the
interfering rule in shaping its academics. Rather than developing degree
structures and standards for purely academic purposes, an institution under
the thumb of this rule might be compelled to develop entirely new degree
programs for little purpose other than to give graduate-transfer student-athletes an option that would not hurt the institution’s athletic programs one
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year after the transfer. Thus, this rule presents serious concerns in terms of
institutional academic control.
On the whole, this proposal would likely manage to mitigate some of the
concerns regarding free agency raised by the current effects of the graduatetransfer rule without being unreasonably unfair to student-athletes who are
seeking to transfer. The trouble with this proposal reveals itself when considering the impact that the rule could have on institutional autonomy, and that
should give pause to the NCAA when determining whether to enact the proposal. While the balancing of all three prongs of this framework is of course
no simple task, when institutional autonomy is as clearly challenged as it is by
this proposal, the NCAA must ask itself how it can best serve not only its own
purposes and the interests of student-athletes, but also the academic interests
of its Division I institutions. Thus, under the framework, this proposal has
some appeal in terms of fairness and prevention of free agency, but it may
need to be reworked if the NCAA wants to allow its member institutions to
maintain academic integrity.
4.

Proposal IV

The final of the four proposals seems to be the least impactful as far as
the overall scope of the suggested amendment goes. The goal of the proposed rule would be to effectively make a student-athlete sit out for a year
after transferring, even if he qualifies for an exception to the year-in-residence rule, if that student-athlete has competed “during the same academic
year in the sport at the previous four-year institution.”154 The TWG’s goal
here is to bring uniformity across sports and make the current rule less complex, as the current rule creates an asymmetry as far as participation in the
same season goes depending on which sport a student-athlete is participating
in.155 The suggested framework’s application to this proposal may be less
useful, since the amendment’s goal does not appear to focus directly on
either the potential for free agency to seriously damage the amateur model
or the general well-being of Division I student-athletes. It also does not
appear to have any significant impact on institutional control. This caveat
notwithstanding, it may still help to analyze this final proposed transfer
amendment to consider if it might have any tangential impact on any of the
three elements under the framework.
For the first prong, the rule that the proposal would amend does not
appear to have any noteworthy bearing on potential free agency. The sports
that are currently out of sync and that would permit student-athletes to par154 NCAA Division I Council, Transfer Working Group, Academic Eligibility—Transfer
Regulations—Four-Year College Transfers—Competition in Year of Transfer (Proposal No. 2018105, 2018), https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/proposalView?id=103294 [hereinafter
Division I Proposal 2018-105] (proposing to amend section 14.5.5.3); see also Hosick, supra
note 138.
155 See Division I Proposal 2018-105, supra note 154 (“This proposal creates uniformity
for all sports, is consistent with the principle of fair competition, and may encourage more
responsible recruiting practices between coaches and prospective student-athletes.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-4\NDL412.txt

2019]

unknown

Seq: 33

the ncaa’s transfer conundrum

29-MAY-19

15:37

1851

ticipate in meaningful competition that impacts championship eligibility for
two different institutions during the same academic year—e.g., golf, swimming and diving, and track and field156—are sports that do not make up a
large number of the overall transfer student-athletes annually.157 Most student-athletes who transfer also do not transfer during the academic year, or if
they do, it does not appear to be the case that many such student-athletes
attempt to participate in their sport at the new school in the same academic
year, especially in the case of revenue-generating sports. Permitting a student-athlete to transfer to a new school and immediately participate in a sport
when he already had participated in that sport at the previous institution
would certainly seem like professional free agency. But that is not how the
current rule operates, as participation in the same academic year for two different schools by a transfer student-athlete is not permitted in a number of
sports, including football, basketball, baseball, and men’s ice hockey.158
Thus, as currently constructed, there does not seem to be a significant risk of
harm to amateurism as a result of student-athletes transferring to a new
school and playing in the same sport for two schools during the same academic year. The proposed amendment would simply make the current rule
consistent across Division I sports.
On the fairness prong, the proposal and current rule both seem reasonably tailored to preventing something that would be very much akin to free
agency if student-athletes at Division I institutions were able to transfer to
another school and play in a sport they had already participated in during
that academic year. Again, most transfer student-athletes would wait to transfer until after the conclusion of their athletic season, if for no reason other
than to maximize their eligibility, and thus the rule likely does not have an
impact on a broad pool of Division I student-athletes. Additionally, this proposal does not force student-athletes to sit out a season under the year-inresidence rule; it simply mandates that if a student-athlete transfers during
the course of the academic year, he will not be able to compete at his new
school until the following academic year. It is likely a rare case that a transfer
student-athlete cannot wait to transfer and compete until after the athletic
season at the previous institution ends, and if such an instance were to occur,
the student-athlete could always apply for a hardship waiver.159 The proposed expansion of the current rule to make it consistent across sports does
not appear likely to infringe significantly on student-athlete well-being. Nor
is the proposal disproportionately burdensome on transfer student-athletes,
given the NCAA’s interest in maintaining a system of college athletics that
does not involve free agency.
Finally, this rule has no obvious impact on institutional autonomy. It
involves no academic standards, scholarships, or other requirements for student-athletes, and it is entirely focused on eligibility for same-year, same-sport
156 Id.
157 See Transfer Rate Averages and Trends, supra note 142.
158 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 4, § 14.5.5.3, at 188.
159 Id. § 12.8.4, at 86–88.
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transfers. Thus, the rule does not threaten institutional control of academics. Altogether, this proposal generally comports with all three prongs of the
framework, and though its impact on those goals is less clear than the other
three proposals, it is still important for the NCAA to keep fairness to studentathletes and institutional autonomy in mind as it seeks to control potential
free agency.
B.

The Future of the One-Time Transfer Exception

Finally, this Section will very briefly touch on some considerations and
issues surrounding the one-time transfer exception, a rule for which the
TWG did not make any proposed amendments. One of the greatest issues
some commentators have with the one-time transfer exception is that it is
only available to sports other than baseball, basketball, football, or men’s ice
hockey—in other words, the sports that generate the most revenue.160 Some
have called for the exception to be extended such that it would be available
to all sports,161 while others have argued that the exception should not be
available to anyone. Mike Krzyzewski, the head coach of the Duke University
men’s basketball program, simply wants consistency across Division I sports,
whichever direction that consistency is: “There should be no exceptions . . . .
Everybody should have to sit out . . . just to make it equal. . . . If [the NCAA
wants] to let everybody play right away [after transferring], then let everybody play right away . . . . Everybody should be treated the same.”162 The
primary drive behind some resolution for the one-time transfer exception is
not only a desire for consistency, but also to resolve the confusion as to why
the distinction exists at all. Recall the discussion regarding equity in Section
I.C: if the NCAA is seeking to create an equitable system, it must consider
equity between student-athletes across all sports, as well as between programs
and institutions. The one-time transfer exception, as currently constructed,
creates an asymmetry between Division I student-athletes participating in revenue-generating sports and those student-athletes competing in nonrevenue
sports. In order to maintain a system that is fair to student-athletes regardless
of sport, the NCAA is going to have to address the one-time transfer exception one way or another.
A natural follow-up question is: If the NCAA were to do away with the
exception, how exactly would the organization deal with transfer student-athletes? Should there be some kind of neutral or objective principle, such as a
grade point average (GPA) threshold above which transfer student-athletes
would not have to sit out a year, but below which they would? The Division I
Transfer Working Group has previously considered such a measure,163 but
160 See Schafer, supra note 34, at 493–94 (“The One-Time Transfer Exception shows the
true rationale behind the Year in Residence Rule: the NCAA does not want free agency in
its most popular and profitable sports.”).
161 See generally Parrish, supra note 103.
162 Id. (alterations in original).
163 Michelle Brutlag Hosick, DI Committee on Academics Considers Transfer Rule Changes,
NCAA (Apr. 5, 2018), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/di-com-
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reactions to the idea have been fierce. Those who view the potential academic benchmark for immediate eligibility as a good idea argue that the rule
would incentivize student-athletes to maintain good grades in order to have
the option to be immediately eligible should they want to transfer. For example, one student-athlete endorsed the idea “because it [would] keep[ ] you
solid in school.”164 Others disagree vehemently with a GPA requirement for
immediate eligibility of transfers for two main reasons: first, because the difficulty of achieving a good GPA varies between schools;165 and second, and
perhaps more concerning, because of the potential for the rule to work in a
way that disproportionately affects minority student-athletes.166
Additionally, if a student-athlete transferred and was below the required
GPA benchmark, everyone would know why that student-athlete was sitting
out. One could certainly question whether such a rule is really fair to student-athletes or whether it adequately takes their well-being into account.
This is simply one example of a potential solution to the one-time transfer
exception problem. It illustrates just how difficult resolving the issue may
be—indeed, that may be the reason that the TWG did not propose any rules
related to the exception in its most recent iteration. The NCAA will need to
seriously consider equity and fairness to its student-athletes when determining what to do, and it may have to come up with a creative solution in order
to balance its own interests in amateurism with the interests of studentathletes.
CONCLUSION
The prevalence of transfers in NCAA Division I sports has trended
upward at an increasing rate over the last several years and has shown no
signs of slowing down. As transfer student-athletes, both graduate and
undergraduate, have made headlines for their transfers, the Division I rules
that govern those transfers have come under increased scrutiny, especially in
light of the NCAA’s stated mission and purposes. The year-in-residence rule,
requiring student-athletes to sit out a full year after transferring; the graduate-transfer rule, permitting graduate student-athletes to transfer and compete immediately; and the one-time transfer exception, permitting studentathletes in sports other than basketball, football, baseball, and men’s ice
hockey to avoid the year-in-residence requirement for their first transfer,
have particularly been put under the microscope. Two of the NCAA’s guiding principles that are most relevant in the transfer context are a commitment to an amateur model of intercollegiate athletics and a commitment to
mittee-academics-considers-transfer-rule-changes (discussing the recommendation from
the Division I Committee on Academics to adopt of an academic benchmark for immediate eligibility after transfer).
164 Dodd, supra note 12.
165 Id. (“[S]ome pointed out that a ‘B’ at Stanford isn’t the same as a ‘B’ at, say,
Toledo.”).
166 Id. (“[Y]ou don’t have to be very hard into it to realize [an academic benchmark]
cuts very hard across racial lines.” (second alteration in original)).
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fairness and the well-being of student-athletes. In addition, an interest that
draws less attention but is nonetheless significant is that of Division I institutions in having full autonomy over their academic programs.
As the NCAA seeks to shape its transfer system, it must account for each
of those key values—and it took a major step forward in terms of fairness to
student-athletes with the recently added notification-of-transfer procedure
for initiation of the transfer process. In approaching questions about the
efficacy of a transfer rule, the NCAA and its members should use the following normative framework to determine how well such a rule comports with
the NCAA’s purposes and values: (1) Is the rule designed and tailored in a
way that it can be reasonably expected to prevent the creation of a free
agency that might threaten the NCAA’s model of amateurism; (2) is the rule
fair to student-athletes, or does it impose a burden on student-athletes that is
not commensurate with or exceeds the NCAA’s concern and interest in
maintaining that amateur model; and (3) is the rule likely to interfere with
institutional autonomy by influencing institutions’ academic decisions? The
NCAA has four recently proposed transfer rules that will be voted on in the
2018–19 legislative cycle; these proposals provide good examples of the sort
of solutions the NCAA is trying to come up with in order to move its transfer
system forward. Applying the normative framework sheds light on the proposals’ appropriateness given the NCAA’s goals in the realm of transfer regulations. Because of the impact that these rules can have on Division I
student-athletes, Division I institutions, and the fabric of intercollegiate athletics as a whole, it is important that the NCAA and member institutions
approach these issues with care, especially as those organizations consider
how to deal with the complexities surrounding the one-time transfer exception and the ability of student-athletes to transfer with or without restriction.
Against that backdrop and using the suggested framework, we can be hopeful
that the modern transfer rules will embody fairness for student-athletes’ wellbeing while maintaining the integrity of intercollegiate athletics.

